With defence in an unheralded period of uncertainty it is always pleasant to find some firm ground. To that end the notion that the use of simulation in military training will increase dramatically over the next 5 years will not cause much disagreement.
Against a training burden that has never been so intensive the MoD is faced with equipment costs increasing, availability of ammunition decreasing and the complexity of training clashing with emerging restrictions. Simulation is a critical tool in tackling these problems.
Given the scale of this challenge, coupled with the breadth (more on this later) of the UK defence industry, integrating multiple systems into a single virtual battlefield (or Single Synthetic Environment) demands simple, understandable, interoperable and effective standards. We are not there.
Where are we?
The world of defence simulation is sufficiently opaque. This piece does not intend to add to that technical layer of fog. Rather it intends to explain the current issues as simply as possible, before offering three potential solutions.
In 2024 we are collectively spoiled. We are accustomed to the concept of "plug in and play" across our lives with HDMI cables, USB plugs, QI charging among others. So much so that one might casually assume that the same level of standardisation would be found in defence simulation hardware.
DIS (or the Distributed Interactive Simulation standard) was created in 1992 from work done with SimNet (created in 1987). Despite cancellation by NATO in 2010 it is still in use within the MoD. DIS's successor HLA (High Level Architecture), formed from a blend of DIS and ALSP (Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol) in 1996, is still 1 year older than the Nintendo64 game Goldeneye, at 28.
Despite iteration, both standards are outdated and limiting. This limitation is exacerbated by the number of adaptations being made with lenient, or in some cases no, centralised oversight (despite the valiant efforts of some in the UK through the Defence Policy for Modelling and Simulation - DMASC). Experimental Protocol Data Units (PDUs for short)are network messages created by all parties to overcome the standard's shortfalls.
Their variance, lack of regulation and lack of standardisation have created a situation akin to the simulation Tower of Babel.
An unwillingness to conduct wholesale change, combined with a broader lack of understanding is now leading to the creation of an entirely unexpected problem - the launch of new products to overcome the shortfalls of DIS and HLA. Far from solving the problem by filling the gaps, this is adding to both the complexity and now the cost of new capabilities. Imagine the entire country having to use plug adaptors, just because manufacturers were unwilling to adhere to the Type G standard.
Nobody would tolerate it there: so why do we tolerate it in defence?
Solution 1: Unilateral not collaborative development.
There are 3 potential solutions to this issue and these will be looked at in increasing order of feasibility.
The MoD likes collaboration and partnerships and with the technological breadth and challenges on the global stage this has it's place. That being said, some of the biggest technological leaps of the last 20 years have been made by singular organisations headed up by empowered and focused leaders.
Nowhere would this difference in approach be more apparent than when comparing Project Purple (the 2005-2007 £120M development of the first generation iPhone) and Morpheus (the now cancelled 2017-2024 £690M component of the development of the next generation of tactical communications)
Collaboration is critical to development but when that approach drifts into "design by committee", both from MoD and industry, things go wrong.
Especially when said collaboration is not being done to ensure best in class but to prop up a British defence industry landscape that is overburdened , when adjusted to a like for like comparison with the US DoD.
One way to simplify...
Against a training burden that has never been so intensive the MoD is faced with equipment costs increasing, availability of ammunition decreasing and the complexity of training clashing with emerging restrictions. Simulation is a critical tool in tackling these problems.
Given the scale of this challenge, coupled with the breadth (more on this later) of the UK defence industry, integrating multiple systems into a single virtual battlefield (or Single Synthetic Environment) demands simple, understandable, interoperable and effective standards. We are not there.
Where are we?
The world of defence simulation is sufficiently opaque. This piece does not intend to add to that technical layer of fog. Rather it intends to explain the current issues as simply as possible, before offering three potential solutions.
In 2024 we are collectively spoiled. We are accustomed to the concept of "plug in and play" across our lives with HDMI cables, USB plugs, QI charging among others. So much so that one might casually assume that the same level of standardisation would be found in defence simulation hardware.
DIS (or the Distributed Interactive Simulation standard) was created in 1992 from work done with SimNet (created in 1987). Despite cancellation by NATO in 2010 it is still in use within the MoD. DIS's successor HLA (High Level Architecture), formed from a blend of DIS and ALSP (Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol) in 1996, is still 1 year older than the Nintendo64 game Goldeneye, at 28.
Despite iteration, both standards are outdated and limiting. This limitation is exacerbated by the number of adaptations being made with lenient, or in some cases no, centralised oversight (despite the valiant efforts of some in the UK through the Defence Policy for Modelling and Simulation - DMASC). Experimental Protocol Data Units (PDUs for short)are network messages created by all parties to overcome the standard's shortfalls.
Their variance, lack of regulation and lack of standardisation have created a situation akin to the simulation Tower of Babel.
An unwillingness to conduct wholesale change, combined with a broader lack of understanding is now leading to the creation of an entirely unexpected problem - the launch of new products to overcome the shortfalls of DIS and HLA. Far from solving the problem by filling the gaps, this is adding to both the complexity and now the cost of new capabilities. Imagine the entire country having to use plug adaptors, just because manufacturers were unwilling to adhere to the Type G standard.
Nobody would tolerate it there: so why do we tolerate it in defence?
Solution 1: Unilateral not collaborative development.
There are 3 potential solutions to this issue and these will be looked at in increasing order of feasibility.
The MoD likes collaboration and partnerships and with the technological breadth and challenges on the global stage this has it's place. That being said, some of the biggest technological leaps of the last 20 years have been made by singular organisations headed up by empowered and focused leaders.
Nowhere would this difference in approach be more apparent than when comparing Project Purple (the 2005-2007 £120M development of the first generation iPhone) and Morpheus (the now cancelled 2017-2024 £690M component of the development of the next generation of tactical communications)
Collaboration is critical to development but when that approach drifts into "design by committee", both from MoD and industry, things go wrong.
Especially when said collaboration is not being done to ensure best in class but to prop up a British defence industry landscape that is overburdened , when adjusted to a like for like comparison with the US DoD.
One way to simplify...