Introduction
President Donald Trump's attempt to end the war in Ukraine continues, but for how much longer? He has recently stated that his patience is wearing thin. Even if a meaningful ceasefire materialises, the extent to which the U.S. might provide security guarantees is still unknown.
One thing that appears to be clear is that European nations will be taking the lead in any peacekeeping force used to enforce whatever peace deal might be negotiated, and that NATO security guarantees, such as Article 5, may not extend to this force. This poses a unique risk when it comes to potential nuclear escalation should further conflict occur in the future. A lack of NATO security guarantees may leave a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine vulnerable to nuclear strike.
A brief hypothetical scenario may help demonstrate this.
The year is 2029…
President Donald Trump is coming towards the end of his second term as president, and it looks like a more pro-Ukraine candidate is going to be elected. Russia, having seen a significant easing of sanctions as part of a peace deal, has reconstituted and improved its military capability and learned its mistakes from the 2022 invasion. Worried by the possibility that the U.S. will soon be more likely to intervene to defend Ukraine, President Putin decides to act.
After conducting a series of false flag operations - designed to look like Ukrainian aggression - Russia launches another invasion, banking on the European peacekeeping force being unwilling to take significant casualties, and the U.S. not intervening.
However, Russia still suffers from significant command and control issues, and the European nations have also improved their own military capabilities. Russian forces make little progress and suffer heavy casualties - European casualties remain surprisingly limited. In Moscow, the prospect of another failed military operation sees pressure mounting on Putin - talks of a coup swirl. Putin decides to make good on a threat that was now falling on deaf ears.
Russia launches a SS-26 Stone SSM with a 10-kiloton tactical warhead.
Deliberately used in a less kinetic area of the front, targeting reconnaissance forces proving routes for a potential advance, the military impact of the detonation was limited, as was intended by Russia; however, the strategic impact was huge. With the U.S. still unwilling to provide material support, despite overwhelming condemnation of Russia's actions, Europe and Ukraine struggle to come up with a response, with Russia threatening further use of its tactical nuclear weapons.
Sheltering under a Anglo-French umbrella?
Anyone with a vague knowledge of the Ukraine conflict could probably poke holes in the scenario above, but it illustrates a point. A peacekeeping force in Ukraine may face the risk of nuclear escalation by Russia. The U.K. and France may offer to have Ukraine under their 'nuclear umbrella'; however, with only strategic weapons at their disposal, a nuclear response to a tactical nuclear strike would be grossly disproportionate.
Given this, any force in Ukraine needs to ensure it can deal with a nuclear strike in a conventional way. This will include ensuring maneuver forces can continue to operate in a nuclear environment, as the employment of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia will likely, at least in part, be designed to limit freedom of movement.
Fighting in a nuclear environment
A nuclear strike would require a military force to deal with a number of challenges. The blast itself will almost certainly lead to casualties, just like a conventional munition. The thermal radiation of even a 10-kiloton warhead is likely to cause anything flammable within hundreds of meters to ignite and cause severe burns to those in the vicinity.
Ionizing radiation will soon see cases of radiation sickness beginning to appear, which, even if not fatal, will require specialized medical treatment. Residual radiation from unfissioned weapon debris and radioactive fission ...
President Donald Trump's attempt to end the war in Ukraine continues, but for how much longer? He has recently stated that his patience is wearing thin. Even if a meaningful ceasefire materialises, the extent to which the U.S. might provide security guarantees is still unknown.
One thing that appears to be clear is that European nations will be taking the lead in any peacekeeping force used to enforce whatever peace deal might be negotiated, and that NATO security guarantees, such as Article 5, may not extend to this force. This poses a unique risk when it comes to potential nuclear escalation should further conflict occur in the future. A lack of NATO security guarantees may leave a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine vulnerable to nuclear strike.
A brief hypothetical scenario may help demonstrate this.
The year is 2029…
President Donald Trump is coming towards the end of his second term as president, and it looks like a more pro-Ukraine candidate is going to be elected. Russia, having seen a significant easing of sanctions as part of a peace deal, has reconstituted and improved its military capability and learned its mistakes from the 2022 invasion. Worried by the possibility that the U.S. will soon be more likely to intervene to defend Ukraine, President Putin decides to act.
After conducting a series of false flag operations - designed to look like Ukrainian aggression - Russia launches another invasion, banking on the European peacekeeping force being unwilling to take significant casualties, and the U.S. not intervening.
However, Russia still suffers from significant command and control issues, and the European nations have also improved their own military capabilities. Russian forces make little progress and suffer heavy casualties - European casualties remain surprisingly limited. In Moscow, the prospect of another failed military operation sees pressure mounting on Putin - talks of a coup swirl. Putin decides to make good on a threat that was now falling on deaf ears.
Russia launches a SS-26 Stone SSM with a 10-kiloton tactical warhead.
Deliberately used in a less kinetic area of the front, targeting reconnaissance forces proving routes for a potential advance, the military impact of the detonation was limited, as was intended by Russia; however, the strategic impact was huge. With the U.S. still unwilling to provide material support, despite overwhelming condemnation of Russia's actions, Europe and Ukraine struggle to come up with a response, with Russia threatening further use of its tactical nuclear weapons.
Sheltering under a Anglo-French umbrella?
Anyone with a vague knowledge of the Ukraine conflict could probably poke holes in the scenario above, but it illustrates a point. A peacekeeping force in Ukraine may face the risk of nuclear escalation by Russia. The U.K. and France may offer to have Ukraine under their 'nuclear umbrella'; however, with only strategic weapons at their disposal, a nuclear response to a tactical nuclear strike would be grossly disproportionate.
Given this, any force in Ukraine needs to ensure it can deal with a nuclear strike in a conventional way. This will include ensuring maneuver forces can continue to operate in a nuclear environment, as the employment of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia will likely, at least in part, be designed to limit freedom of movement.
Fighting in a nuclear environment
A nuclear strike would require a military force to deal with a number of challenges. The blast itself will almost certainly lead to casualties, just like a conventional munition. The thermal radiation of even a 10-kiloton warhead is likely to cause anything flammable within hundreds of meters to ignite and cause severe burns to those in the vicinity.
Ionizing radiation will soon see cases of radiation sickness beginning to appear, which, even if not fatal, will require specialized medical treatment. Residual radiation from unfissioned weapon debris and radioactive fission ...