Why Did the ECHR Deny Us the Right to Know the Full Extent of the Russian Attack on British Democracy?
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In another attempt to delay the moment of reckoning, the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on 22 July 2025 in Bradshaw and Others v. United Kingdom seems to serve as an attempt to protect the legitimacy of governments in European countries where Russian interference in democratic processes has been particularly effective.
The case was brought by (now former) British MPs Ben Bradshaw of Labour, Caroline Lucas of the Greens and Alyn Smith of the SNP. It maintained that by denying the country a proper investigation into Russian interference - which would have allowed Parliament to take informed and adequate measures to protect sovereign democracy from foreign manipulation - the UK Government breached the fundamental right, as voters, to free and fair elections. In particular, the case centred on the 2016 EU Referendum and the 2019 General Election.
The Court, composed of seven judges, found no violation of the right to free elections under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. But could it be that their ruling on this UK claim actually reflected the extent to which the rest of Europe has been affected by Russian interference over the past decade or more?
The Truth About Russia's Campaign of Interference in British Democracy
Sergei Cristo is the main protagonist of the chart-topping podcast "Sergei and the Westminster Spy Ring" that exposed a highly successful covert Russian interference operation in the UK between 2010 and 2020. The podcast has recently received three nominations in the British Podcast Awards 2025.
A Europe-Wide Decision
The ECHR's judgment was not merely a ruling on UK procedures. The Court itself designated this claim as one of its "impact cases", which can lead to "a change or clarification of international or domestic legislation or practice" across the 46 Council of Europe member states.
Had the Court ruled that the UK failed in its positive obligation to investigate foreign interference, it would have established a legal precedent. Pro-democracy groups, for example, could then have taken legal action against their own national governments to force investigations into Russian interference in those countries.
There is always a chance that such investigations could publicly expose the precise mechanisms of Russian covert disinformation and political funding operations across Europe - their effectiveness, and the roles played by politicians, bloggers, commentators, academics, journalists, international businessmen and others in enabling them.
Such exposure would have had tangible ripple effects across the Continent. European states, from France to Slovakia, would have been forced to scrutinise their own failures. Intelligence and security agencies could have come under increased pressure to release files on Russian meddling, including potentially embarrassing details about the behaviour of political and business elites. Some governments might even have had to face situations similar to Romania, where the Supreme Court ordered a re-run of elections in 2024 following blatant Russian interference.
In countries where Kremlin-linked elites still operate freely, it could have pushed governments towards meaningful transparency and exposed corruption - or even treason - at the highest levels of political and corporate life.
Instead, without much probing, the judges accepted the UK Government's claim that its actions - including two parliamentary reports and subsequent legislation - constituted a sufficient response. But the judgment conceals a deeper institutional failure, with the composition of the chamber raising serious questions of geopolitical impartiality.
Repression Without Borders: How Putin Targets Russian Opposition Figures Abroad
The Kremlin has successfully launched a campaign to export Russia's...
Packed with exclusive investigations, analysis, and features
SUBSCRIBE TODAY
In another attempt to delay the moment of reckoning, the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on 22 July 2025 in Bradshaw and Others v. United Kingdom seems to serve as an attempt to protect the legitimacy of governments in European countries where Russian interference in democratic processes has been particularly effective.
The case was brought by (now former) British MPs Ben Bradshaw of Labour, Caroline Lucas of the Greens and Alyn Smith of the SNP. It maintained that by denying the country a proper investigation into Russian interference - which would have allowed Parliament to take informed and adequate measures to protect sovereign democracy from foreign manipulation - the UK Government breached the fundamental right, as voters, to free and fair elections. In particular, the case centred on the 2016 EU Referendum and the 2019 General Election.
The Court, composed of seven judges, found no violation of the right to free elections under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. But could it be that their ruling on this UK claim actually reflected the extent to which the rest of Europe has been affected by Russian interference over the past decade or more?
The Truth About Russia's Campaign of Interference in British Democracy
Sergei Cristo is the main protagonist of the chart-topping podcast "Sergei and the Westminster Spy Ring" that exposed a highly successful covert Russian interference operation in the UK between 2010 and 2020. The podcast has recently received three nominations in the British Podcast Awards 2025.
A Europe-Wide Decision
The ECHR's judgment was not merely a ruling on UK procedures. The Court itself designated this claim as one of its "impact cases", which can lead to "a change or clarification of international or domestic legislation or practice" across the 46 Council of Europe member states.
Had the Court ruled that the UK failed in its positive obligation to investigate foreign interference, it would have established a legal precedent. Pro-democracy groups, for example, could then have taken legal action against their own national governments to force investigations into Russian interference in those countries.
There is always a chance that such investigations could publicly expose the precise mechanisms of Russian covert disinformation and political funding operations across Europe - their effectiveness, and the roles played by politicians, bloggers, commentators, academics, journalists, international businessmen and others in enabling them.
Such exposure would have had tangible ripple effects across the Continent. European states, from France to Slovakia, would have been forced to scrutinise their own failures. Intelligence and security agencies could have come under increased pressure to release files on Russian meddling, including potentially embarrassing details about the behaviour of political and business elites. Some governments might even have had to face situations similar to Romania, where the Supreme Court ordered a re-run of elections in 2024 following blatant Russian interference.
In countries where Kremlin-linked elites still operate freely, it could have pushed governments towards meaningful transparency and exposed corruption - or even treason - at the highest levels of political and corporate life.
Instead, without much probing, the judges accepted the UK Government's claim that its actions - including two parliamentary reports and subsequent legislation - constituted a sufficient response. But the judgment conceals a deeper institutional failure, with the composition of the chamber raising serious questions of geopolitical impartiality.
Repression Without Borders: How Putin Targets Russian Opposition Figures Abroad
The Kremlin has successfully launched a campaign to export Russia's...
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