This week we talk about British India, Kashmir, and water treaties.

We also discuss the global order, sovereignty, and tit-for-tat escalation.

Recommended Book: Power Metal by Vince Beiser

Transcript

When then British India was partitioned by the British in 1947, the country carved up by its colonialist rulers into two new countries, one Hindu majority, the Union of India, and one Muslim majority, the Dominion of Pakistan, the intention was to separate two religious groups that were increasingly at violent odds with each other, within a historical context in which Muslims were worried they would be elbowed out of power by the Hindu-majority, at a moment in which carving up countries into new nations was considered to be a solution to many such problems.

The partition didn’t go terribly well by most measures, as the geographic divisions weren’t super well thought out, tens of millions of people had to scramble to upend their entire lives to move to their new, faith-designated homelands, and things like infrastructure and wealth were far from evenly distributed between the two new regions.

Pakistan was also a nation literally divided by India, part of its landmass on the other side of what was now another country, and its smaller landmass eventually separated into yet another country following Bangladesh’s violent but successful secession from Pakistan in 1971.

There was a lot more to that process, of course, and the reverberations of that decision are still being felt today, in politics, in the distribution of land and assets, and in regional and global conflict.

But one affected region, Kashmir, has been more of a flashpoint for problems than most of the rest of formerly British India, in part because of where it’s located, and in part because of happenings not long after the partition.

Formerly Jammu and Kashmir, the Kashmir region, today, is carved up between India, Pakistan, and China. India controls a little over half of its total area, which houses 70% of the region’s population, while Pakistan controls a little less than a third of its land mass, and China controls about 15%.

What was then Jammu and Kashmir dragged its feet in deciding which side of the partition to join when the countries were being separated, the leader Hindu, though ruling over a Muslim state, but an invasion from the Pakistan side saw it cast its lot in with India. India’s counter-invasion led to the beginning of what became known as both the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947-1948, the first of four such wars, but is also sometimes called the first Kashmir war, the first of three, though there have been several other not-officially-a-war conflicts in and over the region, as well.

Things only got more complicated over the next several decades; China seized the eastern part of the region in the 1950s, and while some Kashmiris have demanded independence, both India and Pakistan claim the region as totally their own, and point at historical markers that support their claim—some such markers based on fact, some on speculation or self-serving interpretations of history.

What I’d like to talk about today is what looks to be a new, potentially serious buildup around Kashmir, following an attack at a popular tourist hotspot in the territory, and why some analysts are especially concerned about what India’s government will decide to do, next.

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Early in the afternoon of April 22, 2025, a group of tourists sightseeing in a town in the southern part of Kashmir called Pahalgam were open-fired on by militants. 26 people were killed and another 17 were injured, marking one of the worst attacks on mostly Indian civilians in decades.

In 2019, Kashmir’s semiautonomous governance was revoked by the Indian government, which in practice meant the Indian government took more complete control over the region, clamping down on certain freedoms and enabling more immigration of Indians into otherwise fairly Muslim-heavy Kashmir.

It’s also become more of a tourist destination since then, as India has moved more soldiers in to patrol Indian Kashmir’s border with Pakistan Kashmir, and the nature of the landmass makes it a bit of a retreat from climate extremes; at times it’s 30 or 40 degrees cooler, in Fahrenheit, than in New Delhi, so spendy people from the city bring their money to Kashmir to cool off, while also enjoying the natural settings of this less-developed, less-industrialized area.

Reports from survivors indicate that the attackers took their time and seemed very confident, and that no Indian security forces were anywhere nearby; they walked person to person, asking them if they were Muslim and executing those who were not. Around 7,000 people were visiting the area as tourists before the attack, but most of them have now left, and it’s unclear what kind of financial hit this will have on the region, but in the short-term it’s expected to be pretty bad.

In the wake of this attack, the Indian government claimed that it has identified two of the three suspected militants as Pakistani, but Pakistan has denied any involvement, and has called for a neutral probe into the matter, saying that it’s willing to fully cooperate, seeks only peace and stability, and wants to see justice served.

A previously unknown group calling itself the Kashmir Resistance has claimed responsibility for the attack, and Indian security forces have demolished the homes of at least five suspected militants in Kashmir in response, including one who they believe participated in this specific attack.

The two governments have launched oppositional measures against each other, including Pakistan closing its airspace to Indian airlines and shutting down trade with its neighbor, and India shutting down a vital land crossing, revoking Pakistani visas, and suspending a 1960 treaty that regulates water-sharing along the Indus River and its tributaries—something that it’s threatened to do, previously, and which could devastate Pakistan’s agricultural sector and economy, as it basically regulates water that the country relies on for both human consumption and most of its crop irrigation; and for context, Pakistan’s agricultural sector accounts for about a forth of its economy.

So if India blocks this water source, Pakistan would be in a very bad situation, and the Pakistani government has said that any blockage of water by India would be considered an act of war. Over the past week, a Pakistani official accused the Indian government of suddenly releasing a large volume of water from a dam into a vital river, which made flooding in parts of Pakistan-held Kashmir a real possibility, but as of the day I’m recording this they haven’t closed the taps, as Pakistan has worried.

For its part, India wouldn’t really suffer from walking away from this treaty, as it mostly favors Pakistan. It serves to help keep the peace along an at times chaotic border, but beyond that, it does very little for India, directly.

So historically, the main purpose of maintaining this treaty, for India, has been related to its reputation: if it walked away from it, it would probably suffer a reputational hit with the international community, as it would be a pretty flagrantly self-serving move that only really served to harm Pakistan, its weaker arch-nemesis.

Right now, though, geopolitics are scrambled to such a degree that there are concerns India might not only be wanting to make such moves, whatever the consequences, but it may also be hankering for a larger conflict—looking to sort out long-term issues during a period in which such sorting, such conflict, may cause less reputational damage than might otherwise be the case.

Consider that the US government has spoken openly about wanting to take, by whatever means, Greenland, from the Danish, a long-time ally, and that it’s maybe jokingly, but still alarmingly, said that Canada should join the US as the 51st state.

These statements are almost certainly just braggadocio, but that the highest-rung people in the most powerful government on the planet would say such things publicly speaks volumes about the Wild West nature of today’s global order.

Many leaders seem to be acting like this is a moment in which the prior paradigm, and the post-WWII rules that moderated global behavior within that paradigm, are fraying or disappearing, the global police force represented by the US and its allies pulling inward, not caring, and in some cases even becoming something like bandits, grabbing what they can.

Under such circumstances, if you’re in a position of relative power that you couldn’t fully leverage previously, for fear of upsetting that global police force and tarnishing your reputation within that system they maintained, might you leverage it while you can, taking whatever you can grab and weakening your worst perceived enemy, at a moment in which it seems like the getting is good?

It’s been argued that Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty may have helped kick-off this new paradigm, but Israel’s behavior in Gaza, the West Bank, and increasingly Syria, as well, are arguably even better examples of this changing dynamic.

While the Democrats and Joe Biden were in the White House, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu seemed to be mostly playing ball, at least superficially, even when he very clearly wasn’t—he did what he could to seem to be toeing rules-based-order lines, even when regularly stepping over them, especially in Gaza.

But now, post-Trump’s return to office, that line-toeing has almost entirely disappeared, and the Israeli government seems to be grabbing whatever they can, including large chunks of southwestern Syria, which was exposed by the fall of the Assad regime. The Israeli military launched a full aerial campaign against the Syrian army’s infrastructure, declared a 1974 disengagement agreement with Syria to be void, and though it initially said it would hold the territory it has taken temporarily, it has more recently said it would hold it indefinitely—possibly permanently expanding its country’s land mass at the expense of its neighbor, another sovereign nation, at a moment in which it felt it could get away with doing so.

It’s not clear that India has any ambitions on Pakistani territory, beyond what it holds in Kashmir, at least, but there’s a chance it sees this moment the same way the Israeli government does: as a perhaps finite moment during which the previous state of things, the global rules-based-order, no longer applies, or doesn’t apply as much, which suggests it could do some serious damage to its long-time rival and not suffer the consequences it would have, reputationally or otherwise, even half a year ago.

And India’s leader, Narendra Modi, is in some ways even better positioned than Israel’s Netanyahu to launch such a campaign, in part because India is in such a favorable geopolitical position right now. As the US changes stance, largely away from Europe and opposing Russia and its allies, toward more fully sidling up to China in the Pacific, India represents a potential counterweight against Chinese influence in the region, where it has successfully made many of its neighbors reliant on its trade, markets, and other resources.

Modi has reliably struck stances midway between US and Chinese spheres of influences, allowing it to do business with Russia, buying up a lot of cheap fuel that many other nations won’t touch for fear of violating sanctions, while also doing business with the US, benefitting from a slew of manufacturers who are leaving China to try to avoid increasingly hefty US tariffs.

If India were to spark a more concentrated conflict with Pakistan, then, perhaps aiming to hobble its economy, its military, and its capacity to sponsor proxies along its border with India, which periodically launch attacks, including in Kashmir—that might be something that’s not just tolerated, but maybe even celebrated by entities like China and the US, because both want to continue doing their own destabilizing of their own perceived rivals, but also because both would prefer to have India on their side in future great power disagreements, and in any potential future large-scale future conflict.

India is richer and more powerful than Pakistan in pretty much every way, but in addition to Pakistan’s decently well-developed military apparatus, like India, it has nukes. So while there’s a chance this could become a more conventional tit-for-tat, leading to limited scuffles and some artillery strikes on mostly military installations across their respective borders, there’s always the potential for misunderstandings, missteps, and tit-for-tat escalations that could push the region into a nuclear conflict, which would be absolutely devastating in terms of human life, as this is one of the most densely populated parts of the world, but could also pull in neighbors and allies, while also making the use of nuclear weapons thinkable by others once more, after a long period of that fortunately not being the case.

Show Notes

https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20250427-indian-pakistani-troops-exchange-fire-for-third-night-in-disputed-kashmir

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250422-at-least-24-killed-in-kashmir-attack-on-tourists-indian-police-source

https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20250424-india-will-identify-track-and-punish-kashmir-attack-perpetrators-modi-says

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/27/world/asia/india-pakistan-kashmir.html

https://archive.is/20250426143222/https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-pakistan-exchange-gunfire-2nd-day-ties-plummet-after-attack-2025-04-26/

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/24/world/asia/india-pakistan-indus-waters-treaty.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/world/asia/kashmir-pahalgam-attack-victims.html

https://apnews.com/article/india-pakistan-kashmir-attack-829911d3eae7cfe6738eda5c0c84d6ae

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11693674

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_conflict

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_war_of_1947%E2%80%931948

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