This week we talk about Indonesia, South Africa, and geopolitical risks.
We also discuss the South China Sea, the US Presidential election, and Potemkin democracy.
Recommended Book: The Heat Will Kill You First by Jeff Goodell
Transcript
By many metrics, 2023 was a tumultuous year.
In the latter-quarter, in early October, the paramilitary group Hamas launched a sneak-attack on Israel which kicked off a new round of turmoil directly, on the ground, in the Gaza Strip, where Israel launched a hastily organized counterattack, and that's led to a fresh humanitarian crisis in the Strip, as resident Palestinians have been killed in the tens of thousands, as the Israeli military has sought out and tried to get revenge against Hamas fighters and leaders, but it's also upended the region as Egypt has tried to position itself as peacemaker, while also trying to stave-off the possibility of hundreds of thousands of Gazans being pushed across the border into the Sinai Peninsula, and further north Hezbola militants have engaged in an, at this point anyway, relatively low-key shootout with Israel across the Lebanese border, increasing the perceptual likelihood, at least, of a conflict that increases in scope, encapsulating more of Iran's allies and subsidiary groups, and possible even Iran itself.
That component of the conflict has also started to impact global trade as the Red Sea—a channel connecting Asia with Europe through the Suez Canal—has been plagued by gunman and drone and missile attacks by Houthi groups in Yemen, which are also supported by Iran and ostensibly launching these attacks in solidarity with those under-siege Palestinians in Gaza.
Further north, across the Mediterranean and Black Seas, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, which kicked-off in earnest when the latter invaded the former in late-February of 2022, continues apace, though the frontlines in the conflict have remained fairly static for the better part of a year, and the two sides have doubled-down on launching missiles and drones at each other, reorienting toward asymmetric attacks on stockpiles and supply chains, alongside attacks on civilian centers meant to psychologically damage the other side, rather than fixating entirely on ground assaults meant to formally claim or reclaim territory.
This conflict continues to shape global alliances and eat up gobs of monetary and military resources, as Russia imports weapons and supplies from allies like Iran and China, and Ukraine receives funding from mostly Western nations, though that support could diminish or even largely dry up, soon, depending on the political meanderings of its allies in those countries in the coming months.
The drumbeat toward potential conflict in the South China Sea also continues to increase in tempo as the Chinese military upgrades and reorganizes its infrastructure and leadership, and forced accidents between ships in the area—especially but not exclusively between Chinese and Filipino assets—have become more common as both sides have decided to draw a line in the sand, China wanting to maintain a sense of invincibility and inevitability for its expansionary efforts, and the Philippines becoming more confident in its regional alliances, which are solidifying around efforts to prevent growth and influence-expansion on the part of China's military—including its stated intention to bring Taiwan under its control, by force if necessary, sometime in the next handful of years.
There's also heightened concern about conflicts and potential conflicts in the Sahel region in northwestern Africa.
A series of recent military coups against elected governments have lent this strip of land the nickname "the coup belt," and a handful of military dictatorships that have emerged from these coups have gestured at creating a sort of rough alliance meant to deter opposition from local democracies—many of which are themselves wary of coups within their own borders, and suffering from many of the variables that tend to make coups more likely, like regional terrorist activity from extremist paramilitary groups, and persistent economic and humanitarian issues.
These sorts of conflicts and potential conflicts are examples of what are often called geopolitical risks: things that are problems unto themselves, but which might also reverberate outward, causing even more problems secondarily and tertiarily, and not just in their immediate vicinity, but globally—all of which messes with efforts to plan much of anything, because something could pop up to render the assumptions informing those plans moot at the drop of a hat.
Economic crises and resource crises are also common sources of geopolitical risk, but 2024 will be historically prone to another common type: that of democratic elections. And some of the record-number of major elections scheduled for 2024 are truly significant, beyond even the normal risks associated with the potential peaceful handover of power.
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In 2024, there will be significant elections in around 50 different countries, with some wiggle-room in that number because some of the elections expected to occur in 2024 may not, and others might pop up as the year progresses. And around 76 countries will have some type of election, inclusive of smaller, regional rather than national races.
If these numbers prove even generally accurate, that will make 2024 the most election-heavy year in history, and something like 2 billion people will head to the polls for those top-level elections, and around 4 billion for some kind of vote—these people deciding who will take the reins of some of the world's largest militaries, economies, and populations.
In practice, that means we'll see elections in the US, India, Mexico, South America, the 27 European Parliament countries, alongside nations that are up-and-coming in various ways, like Indonesia and Venezuela, and those that have seen a lot of instability of late, like South Sudan and Pakistan.
There will be an election in Taiwan that could determine, among other things, and in part, how hawkish a stance its government takes toward neighboring, bristling-with-weapons-and-animosity, China, and the UK will also see a leadership race—one that hasn't been scheduled yet—but if it does happen, that election could flip the House of Commons from the long-ruling Tories to the opposition Labour party for the first time since 2010.
The 2024 Presidential election in the United States is already being complicated by a slew of lawsuits, most of them aimed at former President Trump or his allies, Trump having been accused of all sorts of crimes, and who, as a consequence of his connection to the insurrection at the Capital on January 6, 2021, has been banished from the ballots in two states, so far.
The Supreme Court will almost certainly determine if those banishments will be allowed stand sometime in the next few months, if not weeks, though the other cases also inform Trump's election run-up schedule, as he'll be in and out of courthouses and may see substantial fines and even potential prison time if one or more of them don't go his way.
Republicans have also launched inquiries into President Biden and his son Hunter, and while these mostly look like counterattack efforts from Congressional Republicans at this point, it's possible one them might turn up something real and actionable, so those could also be volatile variables in this election, which will determine whether Trump returns to office and is able to act on his platform of doubling-down on the ambitions of his previous term in office and seeking revenge against those who wronged him, or if Biden will be able to continue his collection of policies, locking things like the Inflation Reduction Act into place, rather than seeing them on the chopping block before they had a chance to really take root.
India's elections looks all but certain to go current Prime Minister Modi's way, as he and his administration have been immensely popular, continuing to roll out a series of policies that favor the nation's Hindu majority at the expense of the Muslim minority, and that popularity is bulwarked with efforts and alleged efforts to disadvantage his opponents and anyone else who might criticize him and his accomplishments—including journalists—using the levers of state; and as tends to be the case in such circumstances, another win would provide him and his party another term in office during which they could double-down on what's working, for their constituents and for themselves.
Mexico's election in June of 2024 will, for the first time ever, feature two women candidates from the country's leading parties, making it likely the next president will be a woman. This election will also ask voters to elect around 20,000 people to fill vacant and soon-to-be vacant public positions across the country, which is a record for Mexico, and could change the on-the-ground political reality for a huge portion of the country's citizenry.
Venezuela's next presidential election hasn't been scheduled for a specific day yet, and it's all but certain to result in another win for current president Maduro, in large part because he's been accused of stacking the deck in his favor in previous elections, and in case that wasn't enough, he's also barred the leading opposition candidate from running, citing alleged political crimes as the rationale, though no one's really buying that excuse, as it's the go-to option in the authoritarian's playbook when you want to ban a popular opponent while making it seem like you're acting to uproot corruption.
This election is interesting, though, despite the outcome being basically preordained, because of Maduro's recent posturing surrounding the issue of the Essequibo region controlled and government by neighboring Guyana, which Maduro has recently said should actually belong to Venezuela, alongside the vast stores of oil and gas that have been discovered there in recent years; he's gone so far as to task local companies with exploring the area to assess where the oil wells and mines should be built, and had a referendum asking citizens if they thought the region should be annexed, all the people living there issued Venezuelan citizenship—and while there's reason to believe this is mostly just posturing and he'll ultimately settle for a deal with Guyana's government to somehow profit from those resources, there's a chance things don't go his way and military action starts to look like an appealing means of staying in power while seeming to be sticking around on the country's behalf.
Indonesia's general election will be held early in the year, in mid-February, and this election will be important in part because Indonesia is such a huge country in terms of population, and a burgeoning giant in terms of its economy and its diplomatic heft: it boasts an abundance of natural resources and is located along the South China Sea, making it a strategically important ally; but it's also one to watch because the people who have run the country's government until this point have largely been elites who were able to take political, business, and military power during the nation's pre-democratic 32 years of authoritarian rule.
The country's current president was the first real outsider to break through that wall of authoritarianism-empowered elites, and he's immensely popular, but hasn't been able to get much done because the rest of the government has been controlled by cronies of those elites.
This election could determine the shape of the rest of that government, and the elites are positioning themselves behind a portfolio of new cronies they would also control, while the current president—who's ineligible for a third term in office, and thus won't be running again—has said he intends to meddle in the election, trying to position himself as a kingmaker in this upcoming and future votes, which could help more outsiders break through that elite barrier, and maybe reshape things in Indonesia in a more fundamental way.
Russia's upcoming election is a Potemkin vote, current President Putin having jailed his actual, serious competition, and his stranglehold on power and the media in the country ensuring that unless he decides otherwise, he'll be cake-walking back into the Kremlin—elections are a farce in Russia, these days.
In Iran, though, where leaders hold some of the same powers over the electorate as Putin, including but not limited to jailing those they think might challenge their influence, there's a chance 2024's election might either force the country's Supreme Leader to clamp down on opposition he doesn't like, hard, in a way that could further alienate an already somewhat alienated public against him and his rule, or, failing that, he might have to deal with a parliament stacked with political rivals who could make his job more difficult.
There was some hope amongst Iran's rivals that 2021's election cycle might give those in charge cause for concern in this way, but that ended up not being the case. So this isn't a certain thing, and there's a good chance the higher-ups just decide to double-down on oppression, as that's worked pretty well for them in most regards up till this point. But there's a chance opposition will be able to slip into some positions of relative power, which could then nudge some of the country's behaviors internally, and throughout the region, in a direction the Supreme Leader and his people aren't happy about.
The European Parliament election will happen in early June, and will see more than 400 million voters elect 720 people to parliament across the 27 member countries, and this will be meaningful in part because it's such a big, rich, influential bloc, but also because there's been a surge in far-right candidates in some countries, that surge seemingly tied to immigration concerns and the conflict in Ukraine, among other issues of the day.
Poland's government, in contrast, moved in the opposite direction, a far-right government that was in the process of locking itself into permanent power replaced by a more center-left leadership.
So we could see an EU that doubles-down on what it's been doing, in a sort of generally center-left fashion, or one that shifts somewhat or dramatically to the right, reorienting toward more isolation and less support of neighbors like Ukraine, which would then also go on to influence the outcome of that conflict, among other global happenings.
One more election that I think is worth mentioning here is that of South Africa, which will see the ANC party, which has run things since 1994, face its stiffest competition since Nelson Mandela stepped into office and became its first black president.
In the decades since, the ANC has never faced a real threat to its governing majority until now, and that means it could be forced to form a coalition with other parties, which could substantially alter the balance of power in the country with the biggest economy in Africa, and one that has suffered from all sorts of corruption issues and problems with infrastructure and spending under ANC's governance.
There are countless potential sources of geopolitical risk and turmoil in 2024, including the aforementioned military conflicts, but also things like pandemics, the emergence of new, disruptive technologies, and economic fluctuations that don't align with the models the experts have been working from and basing their policy decisions on.
But elections are maybe the most straightforward and direct path toward fundamental change at the governmental level, which is part of why they're so valuable, but also part of why they represent so many unknowns and so much trepidation.
Only something like 43 of the 76 countries that'll have elections of some kind this year are considered to be home to fair and free elections, but even those that are mostly just going through the motions have the potential to spark non-vote-related repercussions, so this'll be a year to watch as around half of the human population heads to the ballot boxes and engages in the complex process of both doing democracy in the first place and dealing with the consequences it.
Show Notes
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/24/business/economy/global-economic-risks-red-sea.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Venezuelan_presidential_election
https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/10/05/indonesia-s-2024-presidential-election-could-be-last-battle-of-titans-pub-90711
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/2024-election-cycle-starts-iran
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_national_electoral_calendar
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/12/2024-elections-around-world/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-11-01/2024-is-election-year-in-40-countries-and-podcast-elon-inc-launches-next-week
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_risk
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea
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