This week we talk about tit-for-tat warfare, conflict off-ramps, and Israel’s renewed attacks on Iran’s nuclear program.

We also discuss the Iron Dome, the Iran-Iraq War, and regime change.

Recommended Book: How Much is Enough? by Robert and Edward Skidelsky

Transcript

In late-October of 2024, Israel launched a wave of airstrikes against targets in Iran and Syria. These strikes were code-named Operation Days of Repentance, and it marked the largest such attack on Iran by Israel since the 1980s, during the height of the Iran-Iraq War.

Operation Days of Repentance was ostensibly a response to Iran’s attack on Israel earlier than same month, that attack code-named Operation True Promise II, which involved the launch of around 200 ballistic missiles against Israeli targets. Operation True Promise II was itself a response to Israel’s assassination of the leader of Hamas, the leader of Hezbollah, and the Deputy of Operations for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

If you feel like there might be a tit-for-tat pattern here, you’re right. Iran and Israel have been at each other’s throats since 1979, following the Islamic Revolution when Iran cut off all diplomatic relations with Israel; some backchannel relations continued between the two countries, even through part of the Iran-Iraq War, when Israel often supported Iran in that conflict, but things got tense in the early 1980s when Iran, partnering with the Syrian government, started backing Hezbollah and their effort to boot Israel out of Southern Lebanon, while also partnering with Islamist militants in Iraq and Yemen, including the Houthis, and at times Hamas in Gaza, as well.

Most of these attacks have, until recently, been fairly restrained, all things considered. There’s long been bravado by politicians on both sides of the mostly cold war-ish conflict, but they’ve generally told the other side what they would be hitting, and signaled just how far they would be going, telling them the extent of the damage they would cause, and why, which provides the other side ample opportunity to step off the escalatory ladder; everyone has the chance to posture for their constituents and then step back, finding an off-ramp and claiming victory in that specific scuffle.

That back-and-forth in late-2024 largely stuck to that larger pattern, and both sides stuck with what typically works for them, in terms of doing damage: Israel flew more than 100 aircraft to just beyond or just inside Iran’s borders and struck a bunch of military targets, like air defense batteries and missile production facilities, while Iran launched a few hundred far less-accurate missiles at broad portions of Israel—a type of attack that could conceivably result in a lot of civilian casualties, not just damage to military targets, which would typically be a no-no if you’re trying to keep the tit-for-tat strikes regulated and avoid escalation, but because Israel has a fairly effective anti-missile system called the Iron Dome, Iran could be fairly confident that just hurling a large number of missiles in their general direction would be okay, as most of those missiles would be shot down by the Iron Dome, the rest by Israel’s allies in the region, and the few that made it through or struck unoccupied land in the general vicinity would make their point.

While this conflict has been fairly stable for decades, though, the tenor and tone seems to have changed substantially in 2025, and a recent wave of attacks by Israel is generally being seen as the culmination of several other efforts, and possibly an attempt by the Israeli government to change the nature of this conflict, perhaps permanently.

And that’s what I’d like to talk about today; Operation Rising Lion, and the implications of Israel’s seeming expansion and evolution of their approach to dealing with Iran.

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In mid-June of 2025, Israel’s military launched early morning strikes against more than a dozen targets across Iran, most of the targets either fundamental to Iran’s nuclear program or its military.

The strikes were very targeted, and some were assassinations of top Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists, like the Commander of the Revolutionary Guard, along with their families, including twenty children, who were presumably collateral damage. Some came from beyond Iran’s borders, some were conducted by assets smuggled into Iran earlier: car bombs and drones, things like that.

More attacks followed that initial wave, which resulted in the collapse of nuclear sites and airport structures, along with several residential buildings in the country’s capitol, Tehran.

This attack was ostensibly meant to hobble Iran’s nuclear program, which the Iranian government has long claimed is for purely peaceful, energy-generation purposes, but which independent watchdog organizations, and pretty much every other non-Iranian-allied government says is probably dual-purpose, allowing Iran to produce nuclear energy, but also nuclear weapons.

There was a deal on the books for a while that had Iran getting some benefits in exchange for allowing international regulators to monitor its nuclear program, but that deal, considered imperfect by many, but also relatively effective compared to having no deal at all, went away under the first Trump administration, and the nuclear program has apparently been chugging along since then with relative success; claims that Iran is just weeks from having enough fissile material to make a nuclear weapon have been common for years, now, but they apparently now have enough nuclear weapons-grade materials to make several bombs, and Israel in particular is quite keen to keep them from building such a weapon, as Iran’s leaders, over the years, have said they’d like to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth, and nuclear weapons would be a relatively quick and easy way to make that happen.

Of course, even without using such a weapon, simply having one or more is a sort of insurance policy against conventionally armed enemies. It ups the stakes in every type of conflict, and allows the nuclear-armed belligerent to persistently raise the specter of nuclear war if anyone threatens them, which is truly terrifying because of how many nuclear-related failsafes are in place around the world: one launch or detonation potentially becoming many, all at once, because of Dr. Strangelove-like automated systems that many militaries have readied, just in case.

So the possibility that Iran might be on the brink of actually, really, truly this time making a nuclear weapon is part of the impetus for this new strike by Israel.

But this is also probably a continuation of the larger effort to dismantle Iran’s influence across the region by the current Israeli government, which, following the sneak attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent invasion of the Gaza Strip by Israeli forces, has been trying to undermine Iran’s proxies, which again, include quite a few militant organizations, the most powerful of which, in recent years, have been the trio of Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, right on Israel’s border.

Israel’s invasion of Gaza, which has led to an absolutely catastrophic humanitarian situation for Gazan civilians, but has also led to the near-total collapse of Hamas as a functioning militant organization in the Strip, could be construed as a successful mission, if you ignore all those civilians casualties and fatalities, and the near-leveling of a good portion of the Strip.

Israel was also able to take out a significant portion of Hezbollah’s leadership via conventional aerial attacks and ground-assaults, and a bizarrely effective asymmetric attack using bombs installed in the pagers used by the organization, and it’s been able to significantly decrease the Houthis’ ability to menace ships passing through the Red Sea, using their own military, but also through their relationship with the US, which has significant naval assets in the area.

Iran has long projected power in the region through its relationship with these proxies, providing them training and weapons and money in exchange for their flanking of Israel. That flanking was meant to keep Israel perpetually off-balance with the knowledge that if they ever do anything too serious, beyond the bounds of the controllable tit-for-tat, Cold War-style conflict in which they were engaged with Iran, they could suffer significant damage at home, from the north via Lebanon, from their southwestern flank via Gaza, or from a little ways to the south and via their coast from Yemen.

Those proxies now largely hobbled, though, Israel found itself suddenly freed-up to do something more significant, and this attack is being seen by analysts as the initial stages of what might be a more substantial, perhaps permanent solution to the Iran problem. Rather than being a show of force or a tit-for-tat play, these might be the beginning days of an assault that’s meant to enact not just a dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, but full-on regime change in Iran.

And regime change means exactly what it sounds like: Iran’s government is Islamist, meaning that it wants to enforce a fairly brutal, repressive version of Islam globally, and it already does so against its people. There have periodically been successful protests against these measures by Iranian citizens, especially by severely repressed women and minority groups in the country, including folks of different religions and LGBTQ identifying folks, among others, almost always these protests, and any other attempts to attain more rights and equality for people who aren’t strictly Islamist men, generally result in violence, the black-bagging of protest leaders, extrajudicial killings and lifetime imprisonment and torture; a whole lot of really authoritarian, generally just villain-scale behavior by the Iranian government against anyone who steps out of line.

So the Iranian government is pretty monstrous by most modern, democratic standards, and the Israeli government’s seeming desire to crush it—to cry false on the regime’s projection of strength, and create the circumstances for revolution, if that is indeed what they’re doing—could be construed as a fairly noble goal.

It perhaps serves the purposes of Israel, as again, Iran has said, over and over, that they want to destroy Israel and would totally do so, given the chance. But it arguably also serves the purpose of democratic-leaning people, and perhaps even more so folks who are suffering under the current Iranian regime, and maybe even other, similar regimes in the region. Which again, in terms of spreading democracy and human rights, sounds pretty good to some ears.

That said, Israel is killing a lot of Iranian civilians alongside military targets, and its efforts in Gaza have led to accusations that it’s committing genocide in the region. Israeli leaders have themselves been accused of anti-democratic actions, basically doubling-down on the nation’s furthest-right, most militant, and most authoritarian and theocratic impulses, which makes any claims of moral superiority a little tricky for them to make, at this point.

There’s a chance, of course, that all this speculation and analysis ends up being completely off-base, and Israel is really, truly just trying to hobble Iran a bit, taking out some of their missile launchers and missile- and drone-manufacturing capacity, while also pushing back their acquisition of nuclear weapons by some meaningful amount of time; that amount of time currently unknown, as initial reports, at least, indicate that many of the attacks on Iran’s most vital nuclear research and development facilities were perhaps not as effective as Israel had hoped. There’s a chance that if enough overall damage is done, Iran’s government will enthusiastically return to the negotiating table and perhaps be convinced to set their nuclear program aside willingly, but at the moment both Iran and Israel seem committed to hurting each other, physically.

On that note, so far, as of the day I’m recording this, Iran has launched around 100 missiles, killed a few dozen Israelis, and injured more than 500 of the same. The Iranian government has said Israel’s strikes have killed at least 224 people and wounded more than 1,200; though a human rights group says the death toll in Iran could be quite a bit higher than official government numbers, with more than 400 people killed, around half of them civilians, so far.

It’s been nearly a week of this, and it looks likely that these strikes will continue for at least another few days, though many analysts are now saying they expect this to go one for at least a few weeks, if indeed Israel is trying to knock out some of Iran’s more hardened nuclear program-related targets; several of which are buried deep down in the ground, thus requiring bunker-buster-style missiles to reach and destroy, and Israel doesn’t have such weapons in their arsenal.

Neutralizing those targets would therefore mean either getting those kinds of weapons from the US or other allies, taking them out via some other means, which would probably take more time and entail more risk, or doing enough damage quickly than Iran’s government is forced to the negotiation table.

And if that ends up being the case, if Israel is really just gunning for the nuclear program and nothing else, this could be remembered as a significant strike, but one that mostly maintains the current status quo; same Iranian leadership, same perpetual conflict between these two nations, but Israel boasting even more of an upper-hand than before, with less to worry about in terms of serious damage from Iran or its proxies for the next several years, minimum.

It does seem like a good moment to undertake regime change in Iran, though, as doing so could help Israel polish up its reputation, at least a little, following the reputational drubbing it has taken because of its actions in Gaza. I doubt people who have really turned on Israel would be convinced, as doing away with an abusive, extremist regime, while doing abusive, extremist regime stuff yourself the homefront, probably won’t be an argument that convinces many Palestinian liberation-oriented people; there’s a chance some of those people will even take up the cause of Iranian civilians, which is true to a point, as many Iranian civilians are suffering and will continue to suffer under Israel’s attacks—though of course that leaves out the part about them also suffering, for much longer, under their current government.

That said, taking Iran out of the geopolitical equation would serve a lot of international interests, including those of the US—which has long hated Iran—and Ukraine, the latter of which because Russia has allied itself with the Iranian government, and buys a lot of drones, among other weapons, from Iran. That regime falling could make life more difficult for Russia, at least in the short term, and it would mean another ally lost in the region, following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in late-2024.

There’s a chance that these same geopolitical variables could pull other players into this conflict, though: Russia could help Iran, for instance, directly or indirectly, by sending supplies, taking out Israeli missiles and drones, maybe, while the US could help Israel (more directly, that is, as it’s apparently already helping them by shooting down some of Iran’s counterstrike projectiles) by providing bunker-buster weapons, or striking vital military targets from a distance.

Such an escalation, on either side, would probably be pretty bad for everyone except possibly Iran, though Israel has said it wants the US to join in on its side, as that would likely result in a much quicker victory and far fewer casualties on its side.

The US government is pretty keen to keep out of foreign conflicts right now, though, at least directly, and Russia is pretty bogged down by its invasion of Ukraine; there’s a chance other regional powers, even smaller ones, could act as proxies for these larger, outside forces—the Saudis taking the opportunity to score some damage on their long-time rival, Iran, for instance, by helping out Israel—but any such acts would expand the scope of the conflict, and it’s seldom politically expedient to do anything that might require your people make any kind of sacrifice, so most everyone will probably stay out of this as long as they can, unless there are serious benefits to doing so.

Show Notes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/June_2025_Israeli_strikes_on_Iran

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/06/13/israel-iran-regime-attack-goal-column-00405153

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/real-threat-iran-tehran-most-dangerous-option-responding-israel

https://www.twz.com/news-features/could-iran-carry-out-its-threat-to-shut-the-strait-of-hormuz

https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-857713

https://kyivindependent.com/israel-asks-us-to-join-strikes-on-irans-nuclear-sites-officials-told-axios/

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-june-15-2025/

https://www.twz.com/air/israel-escalates-to-attacking-iranian-energy-targets-after-ballistic-missiles-hit-tel-aviv

https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-strikes-news-06-14-25

https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-confirms-irgc-air-force-chief-top-echelon-killed-in-israeli-strike/

https://time.com/7294186/israel-warns-tehran-will-burn-deadly-strikes-traded-nuclear-program/

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/14/world/israel-iran-news

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/13/opinion/israel-iran-strikes.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/14/world/middleeast/drones-smuggled-israel-iran-ukraine-russia.html

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/15/world/iran-israel-nuclear

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/15/world/middleeast/iran-military-leaders-killed.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/14/world/europe/israel-iron-dome-defense.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/14/world/middleeast/israel-iran-missile-attack.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-energy-facility-strikes-tehran.html

https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-strikes-news-06-15-25

https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/was-israel-s-strike-on-iran-a-good-idea--four-questions-to-ask

https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-missile-attacks-nuclear-news-06-16-2025-c98074e62ce5afd4c3f6d33edaffa069

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/16/world/middleeast/iran-israel-war-off-ramp.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_2024_Iranian_strikes_on_Israel

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_2024_Israeli_strikes_on_Iran

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_of_Resistance

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Lebanon_electronic_device_attacks

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