NATO's Early Cold War Lessons Show What US, Japan, and South Korea Must Do Now
In the not-so-distant future, a U.S. military commander in the Indo-Pacific could be forced to fight two major wars at once - one against a Chinese assault on Taiwan, the other against a North Korean attack on the Korean Peninsula. This dual-front crisis scenario, long considered unlikely, is now routinely modeled in wargames and quietly debated in high-level policy circles.
Yet the United States and its East Asian allies remain unprepared - not in terms of firepower, but in coordination, planning, and execution.
Today's alliance architecture is not designed to handle a simultaneous conflict in Taiwan and Korea. The existing command structures are fragmented, force designs are nationally siloed, and procurement choices are often politically misaligned. In short, there is no unified playbook for fighting two wars in East Asia - let alone winning them.
But the United States has faced a similar problem before. From NATO's founding in 1949 through West Germany's integration in 1955, Washington confronted a world where it had to deter simultaneous threats in Europe and Asia. It responded by building institutions - not just capabilities. The first phase of NATO's evolution offers enduring lessons in how to organize allies, align procurement, and prepare for multi-theater war.
Today, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle urgently needs to draw from that experience before the next crisis begins.
Learning from NATO's Blueprint
At the 1952 Lisbon Conference, NATO members committed to fielding 50 divisions - an ambitious goal that drove significant increases in defense spending across Europe. Washington played a central role in catalyzing this shift through economic leverage, strategic vision, and the shared threat of Soviet aggression. But what mattered more than raw spending was the coordinated structure that emerged: NATO didn't just build forces; it built a cohesive force.
A parallel dynamic is unfolding in East Asia. Japan has pledged to double its defense budget by 2027, investing heavily in standoff missiles, ISR, and munition stockpiles. South Korea already spends over 2.7% of GDP on defense and is expanding long-range strike capabilities, naval power, and missile defenses. But unlike the early NATO experience, these efforts remain nationally fragmented. Without integration, the investments of today may become the inefficiencies of tomorrow.
NATO's lesson is clear: deterrence is not created by defense spending alone. It depends on force structure coherence, shared priorities, and a division of labor among allies.
If Japan fields Tomahawk cruise missiles and South Korea invests in submarine-launched cruise missiles and explores the development of a light aircraft carrier, who integrates and sustains these systems when crises erupt? Which ally reinforces which theater, and how quickly? Without institutional answers to these questions, military planning becomes guesswork.
The lack of a trilateral command mechanism is one of the most pressing gaps. In 1951, NATO established SHAPE - the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - as a centralized node for operational planning, logistics, and interoperability. Nothing like SHAPE exists in the Indo-Pacific today. The U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and U.S.-Japan coordination under USFJ and INDOPACOM remain bilateral and compartmentalized.
The result is a strategic blind spot. In a Taiwan conflict, U.S. naval assets might be redeployed from Korean waters. Simultaneously, while Japan's 2015 security legislation enables expanded support for U.S. operations, political and legal constraints could still delay or limit Japan's full-spectrum support in a Korean contingency - particularly absent a trilateral planning framework.
Rather than creating an "Asian NATO," the immediate solution could be the establishment of a trilateral planning cell within INDOPACOM - drawing staff from South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. With access to real-time intelligence and s...
Yet the United States and its East Asian allies remain unprepared - not in terms of firepower, but in coordination, planning, and execution.
Today's alliance architecture is not designed to handle a simultaneous conflict in Taiwan and Korea. The existing command structures are fragmented, force designs are nationally siloed, and procurement choices are often politically misaligned. In short, there is no unified playbook for fighting two wars in East Asia - let alone winning them.
But the United States has faced a similar problem before. From NATO's founding in 1949 through West Germany's integration in 1955, Washington confronted a world where it had to deter simultaneous threats in Europe and Asia. It responded by building institutions - not just capabilities. The first phase of NATO's evolution offers enduring lessons in how to organize allies, align procurement, and prepare for multi-theater war.
Today, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle urgently needs to draw from that experience before the next crisis begins.
Learning from NATO's Blueprint
At the 1952 Lisbon Conference, NATO members committed to fielding 50 divisions - an ambitious goal that drove significant increases in defense spending across Europe. Washington played a central role in catalyzing this shift through economic leverage, strategic vision, and the shared threat of Soviet aggression. But what mattered more than raw spending was the coordinated structure that emerged: NATO didn't just build forces; it built a cohesive force.
A parallel dynamic is unfolding in East Asia. Japan has pledged to double its defense budget by 2027, investing heavily in standoff missiles, ISR, and munition stockpiles. South Korea already spends over 2.7% of GDP on defense and is expanding long-range strike capabilities, naval power, and missile defenses. But unlike the early NATO experience, these efforts remain nationally fragmented. Without integration, the investments of today may become the inefficiencies of tomorrow.
NATO's lesson is clear: deterrence is not created by defense spending alone. It depends on force structure coherence, shared priorities, and a division of labor among allies.
If Japan fields Tomahawk cruise missiles and South Korea invests in submarine-launched cruise missiles and explores the development of a light aircraft carrier, who integrates and sustains these systems when crises erupt? Which ally reinforces which theater, and how quickly? Without institutional answers to these questions, military planning becomes guesswork.
The lack of a trilateral command mechanism is one of the most pressing gaps. In 1951, NATO established SHAPE - the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - as a centralized node for operational planning, logistics, and interoperability. Nothing like SHAPE exists in the Indo-Pacific today. The U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and U.S.-Japan coordination under USFJ and INDOPACOM remain bilateral and compartmentalized.
The result is a strategic blind spot. In a Taiwan conflict, U.S. naval assets might be redeployed from Korean waters. Simultaneously, while Japan's 2015 security legislation enables expanded support for U.S. operations, political and legal constraints could still delay or limit Japan's full-spectrum support in a Korean contingency - particularly absent a trilateral planning framework.
Rather than creating an "Asian NATO," the immediate solution could be the establishment of a trilateral planning cell within INDOPACOM - drawing staff from South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. With access to real-time intelligence and s...
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